近日，新加坡國立大學李光耀公共政策學院院長馬凱碩教授，與復旦大學特聘教授、上海社科院中國學研究所所長、春秋研究院研究員張維為教授在《Security Times》（《Atlantic Times》第50屆慕尼黑安全會議特刊）上發(fā)表文章，闡述釣魚島問題及中美日三國關系。雙方觀點針鋒相對。張維為主張：中國走和平發(fā)展的道路，現(xiàn)在到了日本和有關各方看清并尊重中國底線的時候；而馬凱碩則認為，中國擺出強硬的新姿態(tài)，將損害長遠利益。觀察者網楊晗軼翻譯馬凱碩一文如下，以資讀者參考：

中國強硬的新姿態(tài)背后傳達出怎樣的信息？是一個強有力的政府在宣告中國從今將表現(xiàn)得像一個真正的大國；還是一個弱勢政府屈服于國內民族主義風潮？真相如何，外界不得而知，但我們能夠推斷，如果中國繼續(xù)堅持強硬立場，其在亞太地區(qū)獲取多少利益，便要在全球層面付出多少代價。這是中國未來不得不面對的新困境。

中國領導層宣稱，中國先受到了挑釁，方才做出了強硬的回應。此言非虛。2012年4月，菲律賓向主權存在爭議的斯卡伯勒礁（中國稱“黃巖島”）派遣巡洋艦的行為，無異于不智的賭博。面對挑釁，中國政府自然不能被外界視為軟弱。與此類似，日本首相野田佳彥不理會中國主席胡錦濤的直接反對，公開支持對主權尚存爭議的尖閣諸島/釣魚島實行“國有化”，將中國逼到了不得不做出回應的位置。

雖然從某種意義上說，中國的強硬是必然的，但中國自身也不一定清楚這些回應將造成怎樣的長遠影響。這些強硬舉措已經極大地改變了全世界和地區(qū)鄰國對中國的看法。十余年來，中國不斷趕超世界大國卻從未引起猜忌和戒心，堪稱地緣政治上的奇跡。這在很大程度上應歸功于鄧小平的智慧遺產，作為一名強勢的領袖，鄧小平當年的威望足以讓中國遵循“韜光養(yǎng)晦、善于守拙、絕不當頭”的國策；而如今鄧的后繼者們要說服中國大眾繼續(xù)保持低姿態(tài)，顯然有些力不從心。

盡管民意難違，但中國領導人仍然可以在強硬手段適得其反時，選擇悄然讓步。我在此舉三個例子：第一，正如我在《大匯合》一書中所說，中國2009年向聯(lián)合國公開提出（幾乎囊括整個南中國海的）九段線主張（見下圖）是不智之舉。在當代國際法，尤其是《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》框架下，中國無法為其九段線主張有效地進行辯護，九段線必將成為中國沉重的包袱。隨著中國繼續(xù)發(fā)展并成為新興的全球大國，未來遲早有一天，中國將處于美國現(xiàn)在的地位，那時的中國就會發(fā)現(xiàn)，今天不利于己的《公約》將反過來保護自身在全球各處的利益，比如在全球各處享有通航自由等權利。

所以，中國為其九段線主張積極辯護，實際上正是搬石砸腳，損害的是自己在全球范圍的長遠利益。如今，中國顯然不能撤銷九段線主張，但它可以悄悄對相關國家私下“說明”，中國劃下九段線的用意僅在于對這片海域里那些自古便屬于中國的島嶼聲明主權。其實，中國私下已經向部分東盟國家做出保證，中國不會將九段線內所有海域都劃為領海。如果國際社會要讓中國默默地在九段線做出讓步，最好是不要催逼中國在九段線問題上進行公開或官方的澄清。

各國在南海的主權主張：紅色線為中國，深藍色線為越南，綠色線為印尼，淺藍色線為菲律賓，黃色線為文萊，紫色線為馬來西亞

第二，2012年7月12日在金邊舉行的東盟外長會議上，中國的外交舉措被解讀為試圖分化東盟，最后中國在如此重大的會議中僅獲得了柬埔寨一國的支持。這是中國的另一項不智之舉，也將是中國外交史上最黯淡的一筆。

然而，中國付出的代價遠不止于上面提到的短期損失。亞洲悄然出現(xiàn)一個強大而團結的東盟集團，本是北京方面巨大的地緣政治資產，團結的東盟不會受到外界的操控，更不會成為中國的敵人。相反，一個分裂的東盟自然為中國的對手們提供了絕佳的地緣政治機會。

美國外交官公開宣稱，數(shù)個東盟國家曾私下表示，為平衡愈加強大的中國，東南亞地區(qū)歡迎美國更強有力的存在。他們所言非虛。幸好，習近平主席把中國-東盟關系放到了首要位置，這將有助于中國的長期戰(zhàn)略。

第三，北京方面時常派遣海空軍到釣魚島周圍海域巡航，已經使日本民眾對中國產生了嚴重的敵意。如今，已有許多日本人明顯對中國的崛起表現(xiàn)出擔憂。

中國的所作所為，實際上助長了日本首相安倍晉三鼓吹的“國家正?；?rdquo;，暨日本褪去二戰(zhàn)結束至今的和平主義外衣，發(fā)展與其國家體量相當?shù)膰缹嵙?。許多其他國家，包括美國和韓國，都對安倍政府的新動向表示關切。但只要安倍在日本國內繼續(xù)受到選民的強力支持——其中不無反華民族主義勢力的作用——這些國家便難以對他形成約束。

俄羅斯、印度和日本之間越來越頻繁的對話與互動，是中國周邊出現(xiàn)的一項新動向，應當引起中國高度的重視。 一旦中國的強硬立場引發(fā)了三大鄰國的共同擔憂，進而促使它們開始緊密合作，中國面臨的全球地緣政治環(huán)境將更加艱難。

中國一貫宣稱走“和平崛起”的道路?？偟膩碚f，和平崛起仍然是中國的基本對外政策，但如果中國在海事爭議上繼續(xù)保持強硬立場，世界對中國的看法和態(tài)度都將發(fā)生巨大的改變，最后中國將作繭自縛，給自己創(chuàng)造更艱險的全球地緣政治環(huán)境。

Peaceful rise or a new Cold War?

Appeasing domestic nationalist concerns comes at a strategic price for China | By Kishore Mahbubani

Does China's new assertive stance reflect a strong muscular government demonstrating that China will now behave like a normal great power? Or does it reflect a weak government that now has to bend to strong winds of domestic nationalism? We will never know the answer to these questions. But we can work out the implications for China if it continues down this assertive road. For every gain it makes on the regional front, it could pay a heavy price on the global front. This is the new dilemma that China will have to deal with.

China's leaders have argued that they have reacted strongly because they have been provoked. This is true. The Philippines unwisely upped the ante when it deployed a naval destroyer around the disputed Scarborough Shoal in April 2012. The Chinese government could not be seen to be weak in its response. Similarly, when the Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda went ahead with the nationalization of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands on July 7, 2012, despite a direct request from President Hu Jintao not to do so, China was forced into a position of responding.

While some of these strong reactions were inevitable, it is unclear whether China worked out clearly the long-term consequences of these moves. They have dramatically changed global and regional perceptions of China. For over a decade or so, China had pulled off a geopolitical miracle by rising up the ladder of great powers without ringing any alarm bells. A large part of it was due to the wisdom China inherited from Deng Xiaoping who counselled that China should take a low profile, swallow bitter humiliation and avoid any kind of assertiveness. Deng was strong enough to pull this off. His successors clearly find it more and more difficult to persuade the Chinese population to continue heeding this wisdom.

Despite this, China's leaders can quietly pull back from some of the strong positions it has taken, as they have backfired. Let me cite three. Firstly, as I document in "The Great Convergence," it was unwise of China to deposit a map containing the nine-dash line (that covered virtually all of the South China Sea) with a UN Commission in 2009 (see map page 14). This nine-dash line will become an albatross around China's neck as it is entirely indefensible under contemporary international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As China continues to grow and emerge as a global power, it will discover like the US that the UNCLOS will protect many of its global interests to have free and open access to seaways around the world.

So if China vigorously defends the nine-dash line, it will essentially be shooting itself in the foot as it will be undermining its own long-term global interests. Clearly China cannot withdraw the nine-dash line but it can quietly and privately "clarify" its meaning to indicate that it is only claiming some traditional rocks and islands within this area. Indeed, China has already given some ASEAN countries private assurances that it does not claim all the waters within the nine-dash line as territorial waters of China. To allow China to backtrack quietly from the nine-dash line, it may be best not to push China for a public or official clarification.

Secondly, it was unwise of China to be perceived as dividing ASEAN at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh on July12, 2012. It will go down in China's diplomatic history as one of its lowest points since only one out of the ten ASEAN countries supported China's point of view at this crucial meeting.

But China paid an even heavier price than this short-term diplomatic loss. A strong and cohesive ASEAN community had quietly emerged as a geopolitical asset for Beijing as it ensured that ASEAN would not be captured or manipulated against China. By contrast, a divided ASEAN naturally provided geopolitical opportunities that China's rivals could exploit.

American diplomats were right in asserting publicly that several ASEAN states had whispered to them privately that they welcomed a stronger American presence in Southeast Asia to balance a more powerful China. Fortunately, Xi Jinping has made cultivation of ASEAN a priority. That should help China.

Thirdly, Beijing's constant deployment of naval vessels and aircraft in the waters around the Senkaku and Diaoyu islands has turned Japanese public opinion strongly against China. Many Japanese are now clearly apprehensive about China's rise.

All this has helped Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's efforts to create a more "normal" Japan. He wants to drop his country's post-World War II pacifist culture and develop a defense policy and posture befitting its size. Many other countries, including the US and South Korea, are concerned by this new drift in Abe's policies. But they find it hard to restrain him as long as he enjoys strong domestic support, some of which is a result of a nationalist backlash against China.

One development that China needs to watch carefully is the growing dialogue and interaction between Russia, India, and Japan. These are the three largest neighbors China has to deal with. If they begin to cooperate closely out of a rising shared concern over China's perceived assertiveness, China may well sail into a more difficult global geopolitical environment.

China has consistently declared that it is committed to a "peaceful rise". On balance, it is clear that this remains China's policy. But if it continues with its assertiveness over maritime disputes, it could dramatically alter global perceptions and attitudes towards China and also end up creating a more difficult global geopolitical environment for China.