近日，復(fù)旦大學(xué)特聘教授、上海社科院中國(guó)學(xué)研究所所長(zhǎng)、春秋研究院研究員張維為教授，在《Security Times》（德國(guó)《Atlantic Times》第50屆慕尼黑安全會(huì)議特刊）上發(fā)表文章，闡述釣魚島問題及中美日三國(guó)關(guān)系，與新加坡國(guó)立大學(xué)李光耀公共政策學(xué)院院長(zhǎng)馬凱碩（Kishore Mahbubani）針鋒相對(duì)。觀察者網(wǎng)楊晗軼翻譯全文如下：

自1972年中日邦交正?；詠?lái)，兩國(guó)關(guān)系從未像今天這般險(xiǎn)惡。許多觀察家們甚至將中日間的緊張局勢(shì)與百年前第一次世界大戰(zhàn)爆發(fā)前夕的歐洲相提并論。雖然這樣的類比過于危言聳聽——畢竟北京、東京與華盛頓三方出于對(duì)共同經(jīng)濟(jì)利益以及對(duì)世界繁榮的考慮，都不希望本地區(qū)爆發(fā)戰(zhàn)事，但毋庸置疑，中日關(guān)系確實(shí)正在滑向危險(xiǎn)的邊緣。

盡管西方媒體紛紛對(duì)“強(qiáng)硬的中國(guó)”大加渲染，多數(shù)中國(guó)人卻認(rèn)為日本應(yīng)為弄僵中日關(guān)系負(fù)責(zé)，中方的觀點(diǎn)值得國(guó)際社會(huì)的重視。從中國(guó)的角度觀察，日本國(guó)內(nèi)政治的“向右轉(zhuǎn)”是造成當(dāng)前中日失和的主要原因；而這場(chǎng)“向右轉(zhuǎn)”又是日本社會(huì)中內(nèi)部的三重因素造成的：首先，“失落的二十年”終結(jié)了日本人引以為傲的經(jīng)濟(jì)奇跡；其次，日本近十來(lái)年走馬燈似的換了十來(lái)個(gè)首相，幾乎都是弱勢(shì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人；第三，2011年的福島核電站事故和日本社會(huì)的一些危機(jī)使日本民眾深受其害。在這些經(jīng)濟(jì)、政治和社會(huì)問題的綜合影響下，日本社會(huì)充滿了一種不安全感，日本對(duì)中國(guó)的崛起也愈發(fā)感到寢食難安，特別是考慮到中日兩國(guó)間歷史遺留下來(lái)的種種宿怨。安倍晉三等日本政客為了獲取國(guó)內(nèi)選民的支持，如今似乎已將寶押在了日本的民族主義上。

1972年后，雖然中日兩國(guó)政府恢復(fù)了正常的外交關(guān)系，但多數(shù)中國(guó)人對(duì)日本在侵華戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中犯下的罪行記憶猶新，兩國(guó)民間從未像法國(guó)和德國(guó)那樣，達(dá)成真正的和解——畢竟，日本發(fā)動(dòng)的侵華戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)奪去了2000多萬(wàn)中國(guó)人的性命，幾乎完全摧毀了中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)。而今，以日本首相為代表的日本右翼勢(shì)力不但毫無(wú)悔罪之意，甚至否認(rèn)對(duì)華戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)是侵略行為，我們不妨假設(shè)一下，如果德國(guó)今日仍然沿用納粹旗號(hào)、納粹黨歌，德國(guó)總理和內(nèi)閣成員仍向供奉著希特勒的神龕致敬，英法民眾該作何感想？

在這樣的背景下，東京方面單方面做出“國(guó)有化”釣魚島（日本稱“尖閣諸島”）的決定，當(dāng)然會(huì)在中國(guó)掀起軒然大波。回顧歷史，釣魚島及其附屬島嶼一直是臺(tái)灣的一部分。清王朝在甲午戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中敗給日本后，于1895年簽訂《馬關(guān)條約》，將臺(tái)灣全島及附屬島嶼割讓給了日本。當(dāng)?shù)诙问澜绱髴?zhàn)接近尾聲時(shí)，中美英三國(guó)于1943年聯(lián)合發(fā)布《開羅宣言》，規(guī)定日本將“自中國(guó)人處得到的所有領(lǐng)土，比如滿洲、臺(tái)灣及澎湖群島”歸還給中國(guó)。二戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后不久，中國(guó)解放戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)爆發(fā)，中華人民共和國(guó)于1949年成立。此后又相繼發(fā)生了朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)和冷戰(zhàn)。日本在美國(guó)制定的和平憲法的約束下，成為了美國(guó)的盟友，美日間的盟友關(guān)系一直維持至今。1972年，美國(guó)決定把釣魚島的管理權(quán)交給日本，此舉引來(lái)了北京、臺(tái)北與世界各地華人華僑的強(qiáng)烈抗議。

根據(jù)中方的記錄，1972年中日建交時(shí)，雙方同意擱置領(lǐng)土爭(zhēng)議。1978年，在東京出席《中日和平友好條約》批準(zhǔn)書互換儀式的鄧小平面對(duì)新聞?dòng)浾哒f(shuō)過一段著名的話：“實(shí)現(xiàn)中日邦交正常化的時(shí)候，我們雙方約定不涉及這一問題。這次談中日和平友好條約的時(shí)候，雙方也約定不涉及這一問題。……這樣的問題放一下不要緊，等十年也沒有關(guān)系。我們這一代缺少智慧，談這個(gè)問題達(dá)不成一致意見。下一代總比我們聰明，定會(huì)找到彼此都能接受的方法。”他還提出了一項(xiàng)合理的建議，暨“擱置爭(zhēng)議、共同開發(fā)（區(qū)域內(nèi)資源）”。時(shí)至今日，我認(rèn)為鄧小平的主張仍是最為可行的建議。2012年，日本悍然做出“國(guó)有化”釣魚島的決定，根本不承認(rèn)島嶼主權(quán)存在爭(zhēng)議這一事實(shí)，這使大多數(shù)中國(guó)人倍感羞辱與憤怒。

習(xí)近平主席是一位更加自信、對(duì)國(guó)家也更有信心的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，中國(guó)的立場(chǎng)也從過去的“戰(zhàn)略模糊”轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)?ldquo;戰(zhàn)略清晰”，部分作為對(duì)美國(guó)“重返亞洲”戰(zhàn)略及日本右翼軍國(guó)主義勢(shì)力挑釁的回應(yīng)。習(xí)近平主席如是說(shuō)：中國(guó)走和平發(fā)展道路，其他國(guó)家也都要走和平發(fā)展道路。實(shí)際上，中日之間已簽有四個(gè)文件，規(guī)定兩國(guó)必須以和平談判的方式解決彼此爭(zhēng)端。在北京方面看來(lái)，日本單方面“國(guó)有化”釣魚島的行動(dòng)，違背了這一原則。

海監(jiān)船在釣魚島近海巡航，中國(guó)的立場(chǎng)從過去的“戰(zhàn)略模糊”轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)?ldquo;戰(zhàn)略清晰”

在某些人眼中，中國(guó)的“戰(zhàn)略清晰”含有挑釁的色彩，但其實(shí)中國(guó)僅僅是更清楚表述了自己長(zhǎng)期堅(jiān)持的立場(chǎng)，北京方面明示底線，也許能夠避免有關(guān)各方誤判戰(zhàn)略形勢(shì)，這或許更加符合各方的利益。從某種意義上說(shuō)，北京可能從自己與臺(tái)北打交道的過程中獲得了一些有益的經(jīng)驗(yàn)：2003年，中國(guó)正式提出了“和平崛起”（“和平發(fā)展”），之后的2005年，又通過了《反分裂國(guó)家法》，這意味著一旦臺(tái)灣宣布獨(dú)立，北京將不得不使用“非和平手段”。這實(shí)際上也是北京自1949年以來(lái)一直堅(jiān)持上述立場(chǎng)，然而《反分裂國(guó)家法》出臺(tái)后還是引發(fā)了臺(tái)北方面和西方媒體的強(qiáng)烈不安。但當(dāng)我們今天回望過去，《反分裂國(guó)家法》其實(shí)為兩岸關(guān)系的巨大改善打下了堅(jiān)實(shí)的基礎(chǔ)。

中國(guó)已經(jīng)將長(zhǎng)期堅(jiān)持的立場(chǎng)清晰地表達(dá)了出來(lái)，現(xiàn)在到了日本和有關(guān)各方看清并尊重中國(guó)底線的時(shí)候了。北京、東京和華盛頓應(yīng)當(dāng)共同致力于緩和中日之間的緊張局勢(shì)，美國(guó)實(shí)際上可以為推動(dòng)中日和解發(fā)揮有益的作用，畢竟在對(duì)待二戰(zhàn)歷史上，美國(guó)與安倍首相立場(chǎng)殊異，而對(duì)美國(guó)在日本的軍事存在，中國(guó)也不公開反對(duì)，中國(guó)不少人認(rèn)為美在日本的軍事存在是一種“必要的惡”，一定程度上有助于約束日本軍國(guó)主義復(fù)活、特別是有助于防止日本走核武之路。

在未來(lái)十年中，中國(guó)很可能取代美國(guó)成為世界最大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體。在西方的歷史上，守成大國(guó)與新興大國(guó)之間的關(guān)系通常是一場(chǎng)零和博弈，歐洲近現(xiàn)代史中此類先例比比皆是。作為一個(gè)文化傳統(tǒng)殊異于西方的大國(guó)，中國(guó)的崛起是西方前所未見的：中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)里沒有西方基督教傳統(tǒng)的彌賽亞傳教士情結(jié)；中國(guó)的古老文化是一種“修筑長(zhǎng)城”的防御性文化，迥異于西方的殖民文化；中國(guó)也是世界上唯一公開承諾不首先使用核武器的核大國(guó)。中國(guó)確實(shí)希望與美國(guó)在互相尊重主權(quán)、維護(hù)共同利益、保持人民友誼的基礎(chǔ)上，共同建設(shè)“新型大國(guó)關(guān)系”；但是如果美國(guó)處處敵視中國(guó)，中國(guó)則有可能真的成為其敵人。擺在中美兩國(guó)面前的，是一次歷史性的機(jī)遇——作為這個(gè)時(shí)代的新興大國(guó)與守成大國(guó)，中美完全可以跳出固有的歷史邏輯，超越對(duì)抗與沖突，成為朋友而非敵人。雙方應(yīng)該抓住這次機(jī)遇，朝著這個(gè)方向努力，而緩和中日間緊張對(duì)峙的局面正是中美兩國(guó)可以首先做的事情。

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Time to respect China's red lines

Beijing, Tokyo and Washington should work together to defuse the tension between China and Japan | By Zhang Weiwei

Sino-Japanese relations have never been so precarious since the two sides established diplomatic ties in 1972. Many observers now even compare the situation to that in Europe a century ago when the First World War was about to rage across the continent. This scenario may be exaggerated, as neither Beijing, nor Tokyo, nor Washington wants a war in the region – that would be disastrous for their shared economic interests and global prosperity– but Beijing-Tokyo relations are indeed experiencing a dangerous drift.

While the Western media seem to focus on what they perceive as a more assertive China, most Chinese blame Japan for the Sino-Japanese predicament, and the Chinese view deserves some attention. From a Chinese perspective, the right turn in Japan's domestic politics is the major cause for the current status of Sino-Japanese relations, and this right turn is a product of three domestic developments in Japan: the country has experienced "two lost decades" which ended the proud Japanese economic miracle; the country has witnessed a string of weak leaders, literally 10 or so prime ministers replacing each other within ten years; and the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster and other social woes have gripped much of the Japanese society. The combined economic, political and social malaises have shaped among the Japanese a strong sense of insecurity and their perception of China's rise as Japan's possible nightmare, given the historical grievances between the two countries. Japanese politicians like Prime Minister Abe seem now to count on Japan's nationalism for more domestic support.

Despite the normalization of the diplomatic ties between Beijing and Tokyo, regrettably there has never been real reconciliation between the two peoples, as there has, for instance, between France and Germany, and the memory of Japan's war atrocities remain fresh and sharp in the minds of most Chinese. After all, it's a war that caused the deaths of some 20 million Chinese and destroyed the Chinese economy. Yet China is still faced with an unrepentant Japan and a Prime Minister who even refuses to call the war an act of aggression. Just imagine how the French or the British public would react to a Germany that still used the Nazi flag and national anthem and whose chancellor and cabinet ministers still paid homage to Hitler's shrine?

Against this background, it took only a single event like Tokyo's decision to "nationalize" the Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands to spark a chain of strong reactions from China. Historically the Diaoyu islands, as part of Taiwan, were ceded to Japan after the Chinese empire was defeated in the first Sino-Japanese war in the 1890s. Towards the end of the Second World War, the Cairo Declaration of December 1943 issued by China, the US and Britain demanded that Japan return Taiwan and all other territories it had grabbed, to China. However, China's civil war broke out soon after, followed by the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, the Korean War of the early 1950s and the Cold War. Japan, under a peace constitution imposed by the US, became a US ally and has remained so up to now. In 1972, the US decided to return the "administrative rights" over the Diaoyu islands to Japan, which triggered sweeping protests from Beijing to Taipei to overseas Chinese communities across the world.

Beijing's record shows that the two sides agreed to set aside the dispute when they established diplomatic ties in 1972. Deng Xiaoping famously said at a press conference held in Tokyo in 1978 when the two sides signed the Peace and Friendship Treaty: "we have agreed to shelve the dispute for the future, and we believe our future generations will be more intelligent than us today in finding a mutually acceptable solution to the dispute." He also advocated a sensible approach to the dispute: that the two countries should defer the issue and start joint exploration (of resources in the area), which to this author, remains the most feasible option for both sides. Obviously Japan's decision in 2012 to "nationalize" the disputed islands, as if China's claim over the islands never existed, humiliated and angered most Chinese.

With the coming to power of President Xi Jinping, a leader more confident of himself and his country, China has shifted its overall stance from what can be called "strategic ambiguity" to "strategic clarity." Partly in reaction to the US "pivot to Asia" and to Japan's rising right-wing militarism, President Xi said that China will pursue peaceful development but others should do the same. Actually, between China and Japan, there are already four legal and political documents committing both sides to solve their disputes peacefully and through negotiations. Japan's unilateral action to "nationalize" the Diaoyu Islands was viewed by Beijing as violating this principle.

Beijing's "strategic clarity" may be provocative to some, yet it may serve the interests of all the actors concerned to avoid strategic miscalculations, as Beijing has only stated its long-held positions in much clearer terms. In this regard, Beijing may have drawn something useful from its dealings with Taipei. Beijing officially advanced the theme of China's "peaceful rise" (later "peaceful development") in 2003, but it adopted an Anti-Secession Law in 2005, which binds Beijing to adopt what's called "non-peaceful means" if Taiwan declares independence, a position that Beijing has held since 1949. And the law caused uproar from Taipei and the Western media at that time. But in retrospect, the law has paved the way for the dramatic improvements in Beijing-Taipei relations we witness now.

It's time for Japan, and the other parties concerned to know Beijing's red line, which is only a clearer expression of Beijing's long-held position, and Beijing, Tokyo and Washington should work together to defuse the tension between China and Japan, and the US could play a meaningful role as a facilitator in this regard, and after all, Washington does not share Prime Minister Abe's position on the Second World War, and China does not openly object to the US military presence in Japan, as it is viewed by many in Beijing as a "necessary evil" to check Japan's rising militarism, especially Japan's possible nuclearization.

China may overtake the US as the world's largest economy in less than a decade. In the history of the West, relations between an established power and rising power are often a zero-sum game, and the European history is full of examples of such conflicts. But for the first time, it's the rise of a non-Western power, with a totally different cultural tradition: China does not have a messianic culture of converting others; it has a long culture of building the Great Wall to defend itself from others rather than colonizing others; China is the only nuclear power to openly state that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons against other countries. China indeed hopes to establish "a new type of major power relationship" with the US, based on mutual respect for sovereignty, common interests and people-to-people friendship. But if the US treats China as an enemy, China may indeed become its enemy. History presents an opportunity to the two countries to become friends, rather than enemies, moving beyond the old logic of confrontation between established and rising powers. The two sides should grasp it and start in this direction perhaps with some meaningful initiatives to defuse Sino-Japanese tensions.