【美國(guó)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施日漸破敗，令諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)得主克魯格曼追憶起當(dāng)年的好時(shí)光。他認(rèn)為，兩黨政治中的意識(shí)形態(tài)斗爭(zhēng)是拖累美國(guó)基建的主要原因，共和黨控制眾議員后，美國(guó)政府的投資步履維艱。美國(guó)中期選舉已近，許多觀察者判斷共和黨有望拿下參議院，使奧巴馬政府徹底跛腳。美國(guó)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)的前景可能更為黯淡。】

前人栽樹，后人乘涼。曾幾何時(shí)，美國(guó)也懂得這個(gè)道理。過去，政府直接出資建設(shè)了伊利運(yùn)河、州際公路系統(tǒng)等公共工程，為經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)打下了堅(jiān)實(shí)的基礎(chǔ)。除此之外，政府還向私人部門提供激勵(lì)政策，比如撥地修建鐵路等。無論以哪種方式，政府都對(duì)有益民生的投資給予了大力支持。

但現(xiàn)在，即使投資的需求已迫在眉睫，即使上佳的機(jī)會(huì)擺在面前，我們也不會(huì)投資。不要再用“政治機(jī)能障礙”之類模棱兩可的詞語詭辯，為罪魁禍?zhǔn)组_脫責(zé)任。美國(guó)無法投資，不是華盛頓方面出了問題；破壞性的意識(shí)形態(tài)已在共和黨占據(jù)主流，這才是根本原因。

先了解一點(diǎn)背景資料：自房地產(chǎn)泡沫破滅至今，已過去七年有余，美國(guó)已變得儲(chǔ)蓄泛濫——或者更準(zhǔn)確地說，合意儲(chǔ)蓄（desired savings）無處可去。房貸市場(chǎng)雖稍有恢復(fù)，但仍然低迷。企業(yè)雖賺取巨額利潤(rùn)，但疲軟的消費(fèi)需求使它們不愿投資，所以它們選擇積累現(xiàn)金或回購(gòu)股票。銀行持有的超額準(zhǔn)備金已近2.7萬億美元，這部分本可借出的資金處于閑置狀態(tài)。

合意儲(chǔ)蓄過高，投資意愿太低，這種失調(diào)造成美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)低迷。要知道，你的支出就是我的收入，而我的支出則是你的收入。因此，如果大家同時(shí)削減支出，那么每個(gè)人的收入都會(huì)下降。

顯而易見，針對(duì)這一情況，最恰當(dāng)?shù)恼呤羌哟蠊餐顿Y。美國(guó)對(duì)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的需求十分龐大，尤其是在水利和運(yùn)輸方面。聯(lián)邦政府借貸的利息低得令人難以置信 ——事實(shí)上，在大部分時(shí)間里，通脹保值債券的利率為負(fù)（目前也僅為0.4%）。因此，政策制定者不用腦子也能想到應(yīng)該借貸修建公路，維護(hù)下水道系統(tǒng)以及改善其他基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。但實(shí)際情況卻完全相反。公共建設(shè)開支僅在奧巴馬刺激政策生效初期短暫上升，接著便大幅萎縮。原因何在？

表面看來，各州政府和地方政府的財(cái)政困境是造成公共投資下降的直接原因，因?yàn)樗鼈冊(cè)诠餐顿Y中占據(jù)著主要地位。

總的來說，根據(jù)法律規(guī)定，各州地方政府必須保持預(yù)算平衡。但在當(dāng)前不景氣的經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境下，政府決策者們看到收入下跌、開支上升，便推遲或取消了許多建設(shè)項(xiàng)目，以節(jié)省現(xiàn)金支出。

然而，這種情況本可避免。聯(lián)邦政府只需舉手之勞，便能幫各州政府打開緊捂著的錢袋子——實(shí)際上，2009年的經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激法案就包括了這樣的援助，正因如此，公共投資才出現(xiàn)了短暫的上升。但一旦大老黨（觀察者網(wǎng)注：共和黨別稱大老黨，Grand Old Party）控制了眾議院，基建項(xiàng)目就別想拿到一分錢。共和黨人嘴上偶爾也會(huì)提及增加支出，但他們?cè)谛袆?dòng)上封殺了奧巴馬政府的所有提案。

任何形式的政府支出都將遭遇壓倒性的敵視，這就是美國(guó)兩黨的意識(shí)形態(tài)之爭(zhēng)。一開始，共和黨反對(duì)的是那些社會(huì)民生項(xiàng)目，尤其是接濟(jì)窮人的項(xiàng)目，但隨著時(shí)間的推移，反對(duì)面越擴(kuò)越大。如今，不管什么形式，不管多么必要，也不管經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況，只要是支出，共和黨就反對(duì)。

只要翻翻眾議院的共和黨人在預(yù)算委員會(huì)主席保羅·瑞恩的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下簽署的文件，你就能大致感受到這種意識(shí)形態(tài)的尖銳對(duì)立。例如，2011年，他們發(fā)布了“節(jié)流減債發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)”的宣言，無視高失業(yè)率，號(hào)召大幅削減開支，把“減少政府基建支出將縮減政府投資”這一說法斥為“凱恩斯主義”。（我以為這只是算術(shù)，但我懂什么??？）同年，《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》發(fā)表題為“分配不當(dāng)”的社論，聲稱政府每多花一分錢，私人部門的資源便多流失一分，而私人部門總能夠更好地利用這些資源。

即使支撐這些言論的經(jīng)濟(jì)模式已在現(xiàn)實(shí)中一敗涂地；發(fā)布這種言論的人年復(fù)一年錯(cuò)誤地預(yù)測(cè)通脹失控、利率飆升，但對(duì)這些無視現(xiàn)實(shí)證據(jù)的人來說，一切都不重要。顯而易見，從地方公路到排水系統(tǒng)，大多數(shù)基建項(xiàng)目是私人部門現(xiàn)在不做，未來也不會(huì)做的。但在對(duì)私人部門的贊歌和對(duì)政府部門的罵聲當(dāng)中，一切也都不重要了。

如此種種，導(dǎo)致今天美國(guó)已經(jīng)背棄了自己的歷史。我們需要公共投資；在利率極低的今天，我們完全承擔(dān)得起這樣的投資。但我們就是不會(huì)這樣做。

（本文原載于《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》，原題“意識(shí)形態(tài)與投資”，觀察者網(wǎng)楊晗軼譯。點(diǎn)擊下一頁，查看英文原文）

Ideology and Investment

America used to be a country that built for the future. Sometimes the government built directly: Public projects, from the Erie Canal to the Interstate Highway System, provided the backbone for economic growth. Sometimes it provided incentives to the private sector, like land grants to spur railroad construction. Either way, there was broad support for spending that would make us richer.

But nowadays we simply won’t invest, even when the need is obvious and the timing couldn’t be better. And don’t tell me that the problem is “political dysfunction” or some other weasel phrase that diffuses the blame. Our inability to invest doesn’t reflect something wrong with “Washington”; it reflects the destructive ideology that has taken over the Republican Party.

Some background: More than seven years have passed since the housing bubble burst, and ever since, America has been awash in savings — or more accurately, desired savings — with nowhere to go. Borrowing to buy homes has recovered a bit, but remains low. Corporations are earning huge profits, but are reluctant to invest in the face of weak consumer demand, so they’re accumulating cash or buying back their own stock. Banks are holding almost $2.7 trillion in excess reserves — funds they could lend out, but choose instead to leave idle.

And the mismatch between desired saving and the willingness to invest has kept the economy depressed. Remember, your spending is my income and my spending is your income, so if everyone tries to spend less at the same time, everyone’s income falls.

There’s an obvious policy response to this situation: public investment. We have huge infrastructure needs, especially in water and transportation, and the federal government can borrow incredibly cheaply — in fact, interest rates on inflation-protected bonds have been negative much of the time (they’re currently just 0.4 percent). So borrowing to build roads, repair sewers and more seems like a no-brainer. But what has actually happened is the reverse. After briefly rising after the Obama stimulus went into effect, public construction spending has plunged. Why?

In a direct sense, much of the fall in public investment reflects the fiscal troubles of state and local governments, which account for the great bulk of public investment.

These governments generally must, by law, balance their budgets, but they saw revenues plunge and some expenses rise in a depressed economy. So they delayed or canceled a lot of construction to save cash.

Yet this didn’t have to happen. The federal government could easily have provided aid to the states to help them spend — in fact, the stimulus bill included such aid, which was one main reason public investment briefly increased. But once the G.O.P. took control of the House, any chance of more money for infrastructure vanished. Once in a while Republicans would talk about wanting to spend more, but they blocked every Obama administration initiative.

And it’s all about ideology, an overwhelming hostility to government spending of any kind. This hostility began as an attack on social programs, especially those that aid the poor, but over time it has broadened into opposition to any kind of spending, no matter how necessary and no matter what the state of the economy.

You can get a sense of this ideology at work in some of the documents produced by House Republicans under the leadership of Paul Ryan, the chairman of the Budget Committee. For example, a 2011 manifesto titled “Spend Less, Owe Less, Grow the Economy” called for sharp spending cuts even in the face of high unemployment, and dismissed as “Keynesian” the notion that “decreasing government outlays for infrastructure lessens government investment.” (I thought that was just arithmetic, but what do I know?) Or take a Wall Street Journal editorial from the same year titled “The Great Misallocators,” asserting that any money the government spends diverts resources away from the private sector, which would always make better use of those resources.

Never mind that the economic models underlying such assertions have failed dramatically in practice, that the people who say such things have been predicting runaway inflation and soaring interest rates year after year and keep being wrong; these aren’t the kind of people who reconsider their views in the light of evidence. Never mind the obvious point that the private sector doesn’t and won’t supply most kinds of infrastructure, from local roads to sewer systems; such distinctions have been lost amid the chants of private sector good, government bad.

And the result, as I said, is that America has turned its back on its own history. We need public investment; at a time of very low interest rates, we could easily afford it. But build we won’t.