美國《赫芬頓郵報》新聞評論網(wǎng)站《世界郵報》（World Post）繼創(chuàng)刊號刊登對中國國家主席習(xí)近平專訪后，1月28日刊載了觀察者網(wǎng)供稿。2013年11月2日，清華大學(xué)當(dāng)代國際關(guān)系研究院院長閻學(xué)通與芝加哥大學(xué)教授約翰·米爾斯海默就“中國能否和平崛起”一題展開辯論。本文為辯論實錄摘編。

《世界郵報》網(wǎng)站刊觀察者網(wǎng)供文

北京-最近，我和芝加哥大學(xué)政治學(xué)者約翰•米爾斯海默就“中國能否和平崛起”一題展開辯論。在新領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人習(xí)近平帶領(lǐng)下，中國的外交政策似乎變得更加自信果斷，國際國內(nèi)對此評論不斷。我們的辯論就是在這樣的情況下展開的。

確實，太平洋地區(qū)并非一切都好。中日在東海和釣魚島的局勢正緊；中菲南海爭端已經(jīng)持續(xù)兩年，仍不見盡頭。很多中國人懷疑是否遭超級大國遏制，美國的“重返亞太”戰(zhàn)略給了他們確切答案，并且鼓動中國周邊敵對國家擴大緊張形勢。最近，中國宣布劃設(shè)東海防空識別區(qū)，部分國家稱之為挑釁行為。

米爾斯海默因其“進攻性現(xiàn)實主義”理論聞名。他提出了一個假設(shè)：中國這個大國繼續(xù)崛起，即使不是必然，也有足夠幾率造成軍事沖突。他的預(yù)測基于歷史先例。他認(rèn)為，在這個沒有最高統(tǒng)治者的無序世界，沒有一個國家能夠保證不對其他國家心存企圖，唯一的生存之道就是最大化一個國家自身的相對實力。

美國先取得了地區(qū)霸權(quán)，由此再崛起為超級大國。門羅宣言首先描述了這一戰(zhàn)略。這個年輕的國家逐漸強大，并通過軍事手段實行其外交政策，針對的是周邊所有國家，從加拿大到墨西哥，以至整個拉美甚至更大的區(qū)域。

接著是不斷擊敗全球挑戰(zhàn)者，從德國、日本，到蘇聯(lián)。美國走向世界主導(dǎo)地位的道路是由數(shù)不清的戰(zhàn)爭鋪就的。為了保持全球霸權(quán)，美國必將阻止中國主導(dǎo)亞太。而另一方面，中國必然要將美國逐出后院，尋求區(qū)域霸權(quán)。

在這樣分析中，簡單地定義美國是主導(dǎo)性超級大國、中國是挑戰(zhàn)者，這會使國際關(guān)系面向戰(zhàn)爭，即結(jié)果的最終決定性因素。

閻學(xué)通和米爾斯海默就“中國能否和平崛起”展開辯論

我同意米爾斯海默的理論假說，但不同意他的預(yù)測。就像美國崛起沒有走英法的殖民擴張老路那樣，中國也會利用不同的戰(zhàn)略以獲取全球領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位。在核武器和全球化時代，中國不得不在崛起戰(zhàn)略上有所創(chuàng)新。

習(xí)近平主席已經(jīng)向世界傳遞信息，中國會在未來外交政策上作出戰(zhàn)略性變化。1990年代初以來，兩個主要原則引領(lǐng)著中國外交政策。一個是鄧小平的“韜光養(yǎng)晦”，另一個是以美國為重中之重。

中國對美國及其鄰國之間的矛盾持中立態(tài)度，甚至有時站在美國一邊。這意味著，在過去二十年左右的時間里，中國獨立于世界舞臺之上，是一個沒有盟友的完全中立的國家，努力避免制造敵對國家，在美國主導(dǎo)全球體系的陰影下專注于國內(nèi)發(fā)展。

在近期的幾次講話中，習(xí)近平描繪了一個不同的戰(zhàn)略方向。中國“奮發(fā)有為”的外交政策將吸引周邊國家，慢慢地，他們的利益將于中國的崛起相一致。習(xí)近平特別強調(diào)了中國和周邊國家的友誼。這種變化比它聽起來更重要。

在無敵無友的外交政策框架下，中國走了二十多年。中國的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展是首要的，凡是對于中國維持一個有利于經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的外部環(huán)境有所助益的國家，除了幾個例外，其他所有國家基本上都受到了同等對待。這樣的情況再也無法實現(xiàn)。

在習(xí)近平領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，中國將開始區(qū)別對待敵友。對于那些愿意在中國崛起中起建設(shè)性作用的國家，中國會讓他們從其發(fā)展中得到更大的實際利益。

通過將某些國家的激勵和中國的發(fā)展捆綁在一起，中國將尋求同一些重要周邊國家建立命運共同體。我們應(yīng)當(dāng)期待，這些倡議能夠包含經(jīng)濟利益之外的更廣的戰(zhàn)略性因素。強大的政治維度是必需的。最終，甚至?xí)由斓浇o某些國家提供安全保障。

新的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)集體特別提出三個戰(zhàn)略集中領(lǐng)域：中亞“新絲綢之路”，東南亞海上絲綢之路，以及連接印度、緬甸和孟加拉國的經(jīng)濟走廊。在這些區(qū)域的國家應(yīng)該期待看到，中國有更大的意愿用實質(zhì)性的經(jīng)濟、安全及其他利益來保證周邊國家的政治支持。

二十多年來，甚至連那些支持中國的國家也不指望和中國成為盟友，以備不時之需，因為中國不會做出任何結(jié)盟承諾。未來，中國會果斷在經(jīng)濟和安全領(lǐng)域幫助那些支持它的國家。相反，那些敵對國家則將面臨更多制裁和孤立政策。

中國的區(qū)域新外交政策將提供更多的戰(zhàn)略選擇和足夠的機會，避免像一個世紀(jì)前的美國那樣，通過武力獲取區(qū)域主導(dǎo)權(quán)。

當(dāng)然，還有最重要的中美關(guān)系。很多人說，當(dāng)今世界事務(wù)的主要風(fēng)險在于，國與國之間完全缺乏互信。我認(rèn)為，信任不是相對和平環(huán)境的先決條件。

自1989年以來，中美就沒有相互信任過，并且未來也不太可能互信。但是利益會是中美關(guān)系的形成基礎(chǔ)。中國已經(jīng)有了很大發(fā)展，世界也有了巨大變化，復(fù)雜的利益網(wǎng)絡(luò)將兩個國家連結(jié)在一起，雖然不是盟友，但也不會是敵人。

雖然中國和美國是兩個戰(zhàn)略競爭對手，但他們之間仍有共同利益、互補利益，當(dāng)然還有沖突性利益。這樣的復(fù)雜性給兩國提供了利益一致時積極合作的空間，以及利益相悖時防御性合作的尺度。

中國的崛起也許是現(xiàn)代世界最重要的事。沒有人能夠準(zhǔn)確預(yù)測其長遠(yuǎn)影響。軍事沖突的風(fēng)險無疑存在。但至少對下一代來說，和平的戰(zhàn)略選擇足夠了。習(xí)近平的新外交政策雖然更加自信果斷了，但會讓中國走上一條更有利于和平的道路。

（觀察者網(wǎng)張苗鳳/譯。翻頁請看英文原文）

China's New Foreign Policy: Not Conflict But Convergence Of Interests

Posted: 01/28/2014 8:16 am

This article is an extract from the Chinese version published by Guancha.cn.

Yan Xuetong is Dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University and the Chief Editor of The Chinese Journal of International Politics. Yan's views are considered to closely reflect those of the Chinese leadership.

BEIJING -- Recently, I debated the University of Chicago political theorist John Mearsheimer on the question of "Can China Rise Peacefully?" That debate took place amid torrents of international and domestic commentaries on China's seemingly more assertive foreign policy approach under the nation's new leader Xi Jinping.

Indeed, all is not well in the Pacific. Tensions are intensifying between China and Japan in the East China Sea over Diaoyu Island. Confrontations with the Philippines in the South China Sea have been two years in the running with no end in sight. America's "pivot" to Asia Pacific has confirmed to many Chinese their suspicion of containment by the superpower and emboldened China's adversaries in the region to escalate tensions. The most recent incident was China's declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone, which some have called provocative.

Mearsheimer, known for his "offensive realism" theory, put forth a hypothesis that, as China continues its rise as a great power, military conflicts are probable if not inevitable. He based his predictions on historic precedents. In a disorderly world without a supreme ruler, the theory goes, no nation can be sure of the intentions of other nations and the only way of survival is to maximize a nation's own relative strength.

The United States rose to superpower status by first achieving regional hegemony. This strategy was first articulated by the Monroe doctrine. As the young nation grew in strength the strategy was implemented by military conquests against virtually all of its neighbors from Canada to Mexico to almost all of Latin America and beyond.

It was followed by continuously defeating global challengers from Germany to Imperial Japan to the Soviet Union. America's path to world dominance was paved by countless wars. To maintain its global hegemony, America will necessarily seek to prevent China from dominating the Asia Pacific. China, on the other hand, will necessarily seek regional hegemony by driving the United States out of its backyard.

In this analysis, a single defining fault line that divides the United States as the reigning super power and China as its challenger will drive international relations for the world with war as the eventual determinant of the outcome.

While I agreed with Mearsheimer's theoretical assumptions I disagree with his predictions. Just as America's rise to dominance did not follow the path of colonial expansion taken by its predecessors Britain and France, China will also make use of alternative strategic options to achieve global leadership. In the age of nuclear weapons and globalization China has to invent new strategy for its rise.

President Xi has already signaled to the world China's strategic shift in its foreign policy outlook. Two core principles have guided Chinese foreign policy since the early 1990s. One was Deng's famous dictum of Tao Guang Yang Hui (keeping a low profile) for economic development. The other was to give the first priority to the relations with the United States.

The implications of these principles have been that China avoided confrontations at all costs and that China would never oppose the United States in any international conflicts which were not related to China.

Regarding those conflicts between the U.S. and its neighbors, China took neutral stance or even align itself with the U.S. This means for the last 20 years or so China has stood alone on the world stage, a completely neutral power without allies and assiduously avoiding making enemies, insularly focused on its internal development in the shadow of the U.S.-led global system.

Through several recent speeches, Xi has articulated a different strategic direction. China's new foreign policy outlook indicates an approach known as Fen Fa You Wei (striving for achievement) to engage its neighboring countries and to over time align their interests with China's rise. Xi specifically stressed friendship and loyalty between China and its neighbors. This shift is more significant than it sounds.

For more than twenty years, China has operated under a foreign policy framework within which it has neither friends nor enemies. With a few exceptions, all other countries were essentially treated as the same with the maintenance of an external environment most conducive to China's own economic development the paramount priority. Such a position is no longer attainable.

Under Xi, China will begin to treat friends and enemies differently. For those who are willing to play a constructive role in China's rise, China will seek ways for them to gain greater actual benefits from China's development.

By tying up certain nations' incentives along with China's development China will seek to build communities of common destinies with some of its key neighbors. We should expect these initiatives to cover much wider range of strategic elements beyond mere economic interests. A strong political dimension will be a must. Eventually this may even extend to providing security guarantees to select countries.

Specifically, the new leadership has named three strategic areas of focus: the "new silk road" with Central Asia, a maritime silk road with South East Asia, and the economic corridor through India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. Nations in these regions should expect to see much increased willingness by China to underwrite substantive economic, security, and other benefits in exchange for political support for China's regional objectives.

For more than twenty years, even those nations that were generally supportive of China could not count on China to be a friend in times of need because China would make no commitments of alliance. In the future, China will decisively favor those who side with it with economic benefits and even security protections. On the contrary, those who are hostile to China will face much more sustained policies of sanctions and isolation.

China's new foreign policy outlook in the region will provide an expanded set of strategic options and ample chances to avoid using military conquests to achieve regional dominance, as America did more than a century ago.

Then, of course, there is the all important relationship with the United States. Many say the key risk in today's world affairs is the complete lack of trust between the two countries. I would argue that trust is not a prerequisite to a relatively peaceful accommodation.

China and the U.S. have not trusted each other since 1989 and are not likely to in the future. But interests will form the cornerstone of this relationship. China has risen far enough and the world has changed substantially enough that a complex web of interests bind the two countries together, not as friends but not necessarily as enemies.

Although China and the U.S. are strategic competitors, there are common interests, complementary interests and, of course, conflicting interests between them. Such complexity provides the two countries the room for active cooperation when interests converge and a degree of preventive cooperation where interests conflict.

China's rise is perhaps the most significant event for the world since the dawn of the modern era. No one can predict with precision its long-term implications. The risk of military conflict no doubt exists. But at least for the next generation, sufficient strategic options exist for peace. And Xi Jinping's new foreign policy outlook, though seemingly more assertive, puts China on a path more conducive to peace.