以下為采訪原文：

Helen: you are a renowned expert on European studies. When you first heard about JD Vance’s speech during the Munich Security Conference, what's your first impression?

Alexey Gromyko：Personally, for me, that was not a shock, that was not a surprise.

Helen：Everyone on the spot was shocked.

Alexey Gromyko：I think that this is the problem of those who were so deeply shocked, because there were many writings on the wall, not just from November last year when Trump won, but from the time when he was the president for his first 4 years, in 2016, 2017, that was quite understandable that a lot of people in the United States, a lot of people in Europe, what we call the European west, were surprised, frustrated or shocked.

But the problem of the European political elites, from my point of view, is in that they are very slow in catching up with the pace of the changes in international system and world politics. For quite a few Russian specialists, and I guess for quite a few specialists in China and in many other countries, it was not so difficult to predict what Trump, his team were going to do. This is not just a factor of Trump personally. This is not purely an effect of personality. This is not just a subjective factor. We are talking about Trumpism. This is a very powerful undercurrent, a powerful tendency in the United States and in Europe as well. So the fact that they were so poorly prepared for the second coming of Trump, for what happened during the last Munich security conference, this is a problem of certain politicians personally and those experts and think tanks who consult them. Of course, the way Vance put it was painful – he focused on the idea that the main source of threat to European political elites is from within not from outside, and of course this put in a very sharp the difference between the current strategic thinking of the United States and in Europe.

In Russia, we have been foreseeing for quite a long time that the so-called strategic decoupling between the United States and the European allies will be facilitated under Trump 2.0. Now this is what is happening. So, personally, for me and for other specialists in my country, that was not a surprise. That was something what we expected strategically. In technical terms that might have happened in different ways, but it did happen the way it did. Basically, this is what Trumpism is all about.

Helen：So you think the change is inevitable. The change is very fundamental, and will certainly have huge impact to these traditional transatlantic relations.

How will it impact the Russia-Europe relations?

Alexey Gromyko: The relations between Russia and Europe are submerged in world politics. They are not in a vacuum. It depends on what is going on across the planet. At least, there are two external factors, which played a very important role, which determines the dynamics in the relationship between Russia and Europe. This is the relationship between the United States and Europe and the relationship between China and Europe. The US under former President Biden pursued a strategy of dual containment of Russia and China. At the same time, Washington continued another strategy of double decoupling – firstly, between the United States and Europe and secondly, between Europe and Russia.

The United States for the next decades is focusing on the competition with China. China, as we know from all doctrinal documents of the US, is considered to be a systemic challenge for the US in the 21st century whereas Russia is labelled as an immediate threat. It goes hand in hand with Washington’s strategy of decoupling from its European allies and with a policy of imposing on them the decoupling of the European Union, its Single market from Russia. That was one of the top priorities for Washington under Biden.

Currently, I think that Russia firstly would be open to stabilizing and then normalizing relations with the United States, and then with those European countries, which have an ability to come to terms with the objective facts on the ground. Russia has never been the party which pioneered any kind of restrictions or sanctions. In all cases, Russia was responding to external pressure. But Russia is a global power. Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council of the UN. For Russia, it is important to have a stable, not necessarily friendly, but stable and pragmatic relations with all countries which surrounded it both in Near and Far Abroad. I'm sure that Russia will exert its efforts in the years to come to have pragmatic relations with the United States and with other European countries.

At the same time, Russia has a clear picture of the geopolitics for now and for the foreseeable future. This is based on the strategy of a “turn to the East”. The priority will be the strategic partnership with China, India, with the other leading centers of power in Asia, in Africa and Latin America. For the time being, the European vector of Russian foreign policy will be a secondary one. It will depend not so much on what Russia wants and can offer to its potential partners in Europe. For a very long time they benefited substantial, especially Germany, from comprehensive economic relations with Russia. Any prospects of normalization depend now on the pragmatic and rational thinking of ruling elites in the member states of the EU.

Helen：I think my humble opinion is that with your proposal of the European, Eurasian security architecture, this is also an indicator, correct me if I'm wrong, this is kind of an indicator of Russia is seriously and strategically turning to the East. While still maintaining a global power, not only to mention a regional power, to maintain a stabilized relationship with Europe, it needs some prerequisites of your stabilizing relationship with the United States. Another indicator of stabilizing the relationship with the United States is two parties sit together, talk directly of ending the war. So, in the foreseeable future, do you think this can be negotiated, can be done?

Alexei Gromyko：Certainly, there is a new window of opportunity now. Russia has been systemic in pursuing the way of diplomatic resolution and negotiations. In the last 3 years, there were several forks in the road, especially in Spring, 2022, when Russian representatives, diplomats, and politicians were holding talks with their Ukrainian counterparts, but negotiations were torpedoed by the US and the UK, although the two sides were very close to striking a deal. Since then, Russia was approached by the West with a “strategy of defeat”, although it has turned out not to be a strategy but a wishful thinking, not a strategy but a strategic blunder of the United States, not to mention the European Union, to try to inflict a strategic defeat to a nuclear power such as Russia. For Moscow a failure in the Ukrainian crisis would mean exactly that – a strategic defeat.

These days there are some indications that there might be a noticeable shift in political thinking in the US. They understand that to waste billions and billions of US dollars on something what initially was just castles in the air is a useless and dangerous thing to do. Trump wants to concentrate on domestic problems, on recovering the economic might of the United States. They don't want to be embroiled any more in foreign military campaigns, in proxy wars, which is a burden for them, which is a very risky thing in terms of possibility of a potential direct military clash with other nuclear powers.

Great powers should try, once again in history, to find the balance of their national interests, of narratives of their security. The Ukrainian crisis is not just a bilateral crisis between Moscow and Kiev. There were some contradictions between them but the root causes of the crisis is in the history of relations between Russia and NATO after the breakup of the Soviet Union, primarily in in the sphere of national security.

Helen：When Russia and the United States enter into negotiations, what are the “must do” or “mustn't do” things, conditions in your mind? For example, European leaders, especially western European leaders mentioned the freeze of 300 billion Russian assets to use for post war reconstruction. Is this something you cannot compromise or some other core interests that you could not compromise at all? What's in your mind? What can be compromised? What can not be compromised at all?

Alexei Gromyko：Firstly, Russia believes very strongly that the expansion of NATO is the main source of threat to our national security. NATO is not an NGO. NATO is a military bloc. And NATO has doctrinal documents. In those documents, Russia is identified as the main source of threat and their main rival. The expansion of the alliance is not just political declarations, but hardware, military infrastructure, troops up to the Russian borders, close to Russian centers of military planning and political decision making.

The proxy war of the collective West against Russia in Ukraine is a Cuban crisis 2.0 for Russia, this is something that Russia is not going to compromise on, but Russia is open to negotiations. However, if a future European security system is based on the concept that Russia is a source of threat, and that the militarization of Western and Central Europe should go on, this is not the way Russia sees how the crisis may be resolved.

We are going to have a complex and comprehensive diplomatic affair and finally, and hopefully, a peace settlement. But there will be several tracks. The first track, which Russia and the United States are pursuing now, is a bilateral track. That's why nobody expected Europe to be at the table. Moscow and Washington are talking primarily on how to restore normal functioning of diplomatic missions of the US in Moscow and of Russia in Washington. If we make a good progress there, then it will be much easier to proceed with the second track on the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis.

I think that the Russian position is very clear - it is impossible to benefit from diplomacy if you are in a hurry, especially when a problem is a very complicated and multifaceted matter, it should be dealt with step-by-step approach. If it goes well, then in the course of this year we might see some normalization in the relations between Russia and the United States and some progress in the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis, but no miracles, no magic wand; it will take time, it will take a lot of efforts. Always, we should keep in mind that there will be a lot of politicians, a lot of countries, both in Europe, in the United States, not to mention Ukraine, who are going to do their best to derail the peace process.

That's why the Chinese factor should play an important role. China was bold in putting forward its peace proposals and sending its top diplomats to different capitals. I am sure that the comprehensive settlement of this crisis will be impossible without a strong participation of China.

Helen：I appreciate you mentioning China's great efforts during the past 3 years with our special envoy, ambassador Li Hui was almost everywhere around the world to discuss how to resolve this crisis with China's efforts or China's unique contribution. But still, Trump is a businessman, and Trump is very impatient.

So how do we manage, or help him manage this pace. I really appreciate that you mentioned about normalizing the diplomatic relations step by step. People put all different conditions on the table, so we can discuss. But still, Trump wants to do it in a hurry. So in your mind, will there be a ceasefire in the first place, then we can do this kind of negotiations step by step?

Alexei Gromyko：The problem is that a ceasefire per se is not a solution. A ceasefire should be seen in a context. If there is a ceasefire within the framework of settlement, this is one thing. If there is a ceasefire without a clear idea what happens next, then such a ceasefire may break very quickly. I think that before there can be a real talk about ceasefire, there should be discussions, very serious and behind the closed doors, between Russians and Americans, and maybe later with the involvement of China, other countries, which in the past years have exerted their efforts in pushing through different peace proposals.

If there is a real political will to use the ceasefire as the first step on the way to the settlement, which takes into account the national interests of Russia, then it is doable. But to declare a ceasefire without knowing what is going to follow later, without any roadmap is a way to nowhere. In real life a poorly arranged ceasefire may lead to even worse situation in comparison with what we have now.

Helen：Do you accept any European military presence as a key peacekeeping force in Ukraine on the Ukraine soil?

Alexei Gromyko：There are some fundamental reasons why Russia was involved in this crisis. That was the expansion of NATO, the demand of military neutrality of Ukraine, and other questions, especially humanitarian ones - what will happen with millions of Russian speaking people in Ukraine. Millions of Ukrainians have fled to Russia, and there were several waves of refugees. That all started not in 2022, but in 2014. There was a coup d’etat in Kiev, and then new authorities in Kiev, who seized power, sent regular troops to the East of the country. Then they did it the second time in January 2015. So, there were several stages of warfare in Ukraine. Initially, that was a civil war within Ukraine, with Kiev, using regular army, then from 2022, Russia was deeply involved militarily in this situation.

The problem can be solved, but we should take into account a number of reasons why did it happen. This is not a single “mine” which should be diffused, there are many. Inevitably, sooner or later, a certain ceasefire will take place. But there are different types of ceasefires – the one, which can bring about the next step in resolution, and the one, which will be just a temporary pause in the warfare. Russia is interested in a ceasefire, which would be a first step to a real settlement.

Russia is not going to accept any deployment of foreign troops in Ukraine without a mandate, which it approves. If there is a deployment, for example, of French military forces or British military forces, which would portray themselves as a peacekeeping force without a mandate, for Russia these forces would be a legitimate military target. It seems that in fact the only legitimate mandate, which all major powers may accept, is a peacekeeping mandate of the United Nations and such a mandate should be approved by the Security Council. I recognize that that would be an uphill diplomatic battle. But who says that to reach a settlement of such kind of a crisis should be easy? Theoretically, it may be possible that we see military forces and deployments from different countries. But there should be very a very clear mandate.

Helen：I totally agree with you. There is only one peacekeeping force, which is called UN peacekeeping force. Your statement is a very strong, very clear one. China is a major contributor to the UN peacekeeping force and also in terms of the money we contributed. So I think maybe China can play some major role down the road of the mandate and in the UN Security Council.

You had grown up in a family of scientists and diplomats. How does that shape your career path and the general outlook? What lessons do you think we need to learn from the original Cold War? Before he passed away, your grandfather, Andrei Gromyko, had praised the then-ongoing process of Perestroika. What was it like around that time? What do you make of all the comparisons between Trump and the Gorbachev?

Alexey Gromyko：I followed, in fact, the footsteps of my grandfather Andrei Gromyko and then my father Anatoly Gromyko. Andrei Gromyko started his career as a scientist. In the 1936, he defended his PhD thesis in the economics. He specialized in the economy of the United States. Only later, in 1939, he was invited to serve in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. But later, in parallel, he continued his career as a scientist. One year before he was appointed foreign minister of the Soviet Union, which happened in 1957, he defended his doctoral thesis.

When he was Soviet ambassador in London, in 1952-1953, he was collecting research material for his doctoral thesis. And after he became the foreign minister in 1957, he kept writing many articles and several books. So, he was both a diplomat and a scientist. He was saying that diplomacy is not just a profession, not just a civil service. This is the art of diplomacy, and the art of diplomacy for him was based on science. This triangle, diplomacy, art, and science for him was a natural thing to pursue for the whole of his life.

He was the one who believed strongly in the concept of peaceful coexistence. That's why the Soviet Union and the United States, other major countries of the West in the 60s and 70s, step by step reached a high level of relationship, the so-called détente. A lot of bilateral and international treaties, for example, Non-Proliferation Treaty or SALT[8]  I, SALT II, the ABM Treaty (which the US unfortunately abandoned in 2002).

To this architecture of strategic stability, of military-political parity between the Soviet Union and the United States he dedicated his life. In order to achieve these goals, the Soviet diplomacy used different means. The main task was not to impose, but to find ways to make a deal, which would be considered by two sides or by all sides as a fair deal. Sometimes compromises, sometimes something that was not in the books and on the paper from the very start, but something that initially was a clear step forward in the terms of reducing military risks, not just in Europe, but on the global level. I think that was what he held very close to his heart - when guns are silent, diplomacy should come to the fore and say its definite word.

I hope that this is what happens this time. After the military phase of the crisis, diplomacy will say a definite word in terms of the settlement.

Helen：Speaking of this peaceful coexistence, China celebrated the 70 years of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence last year very powerfully, by inviting many world dignitaries to Beijing, we touched upon a little bit about the UN through mentioning discussion about the peacekeeping.

So one more question regarding UN and how to envision the UN. You co-founded the Russian movement “Support For a Democratic Global Order and for the United Nations”. How do you envision this democratic global order? How does this align with the idea that the world is moving in a more multipolar direction? On the other hand, there are voices even in Russia about against the UN, claiming it is no longer fit for purpose. What kind of reform do you think would be needed for the UN?

Alexey Gromyko：The movement, which you mentioned, indeed, was founded by my father with my support. Then in 2019 it evolved into the Andrei Gromyko Association of Foreign Policy Studies.

As to the United Nations, when we asked Andrei Gromyko what he considered to be his most important achievements, usually, he was putting on the first place the creation of the United Nations, the conference in Dumbarton Oaks, then the decisions which were taken in Yalta in February, 1945, then the conference in San Francisco, which was launched on the 25th of April, 1945, and then the signing of the Charter of the United Nations on the 26th of June, 1945.

The United Nations was one of the pillars of the Yalta-Potsdam international system. Starting from the 1990s, I've been hearing voices that the Yalta-Potsdam System is a thing of the past, that it is history because the breakup of the Soviet Union, et cetera. But I strongly believe that, the world which we live in these days, to a very significant extent, is the continuation of the legacy of the Yalta-Potsdam System and the postwar international law. The UN Security Council still is the pivot of international politics. This is something which we inherited from the decisions of victorious powers in 1945.

Up to now, there is not a single permanent member of the Security Council, not to mention non-permanent members, which would not value, in the highest way possible, their membership in the Security Council, their status in international affairs. We see these days that, in spite of the fact that for quite a long time, the Security Council was a place of diplomatic battles and diplomatic skirmishing, nowadays this is a place where different discussions, reflecting shifts in the world order, take place. Take the recent resolution, which was on the Ukrainian crisis, which was supported by the United States, Russia, China, and the other two permanent members abstained - France and the UK. Only such a unique platform as the United Nations may be the place where such kind of fundamental things may happen.

I think that the legacy of the Yalta-Potsdam System is still something that for us is not a part of a distant history, but is something that is a “l(fā)iving history”, as we say. Because these days, we still use for our benefit the consequences of those strategic decisions which were taken by the victorious powers in 1945, including Russia and China.

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